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DISCRETIONARY DEATH: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Joshua Womack*
Distrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful!
- Friedrich Nietzsche
1. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran started the year by
hanging thirteen prisoners. The prisoners were executed for crimes ranging
from murder to drug trafficking? Among those executed was Raheleh Zamani, a
young woman convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of her husband.°
Raheleh, a twenty-seven year old mother of two, was married to an abusive
husband at the age of fifteen.5 According to Raheleh, on the day she murdered
her husband she caught him with another woman in their home. 6  After
* J.D. candidate 2009, University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma. BBA Northeastern
State University, Tahlequah, Oklahoma. I would like to thank my family and friends for the
support and help associated with my research and writing of this paper. I would also like to thank
the Journal staff, particularly Kim Jantz, Jarica Nipper, and Cameron Ming for their assistance on
this paper without which I would have been lost.
1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 66 (Thomas Common trans., Paul Negri
& Joslyn T. Pine eds., Dover Publications Inc. 1999) (1891).




5. Id. (reporting that a group of feminists were trying to save Raheleh by asking for the
consent of the victim's family).
6. Raheleh Zamani, Young Mother of 2, To Be Hanged, SAVE DELARA!,
http://www.savedelara.com/Raheleh+Zamani.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter SAVE
DELARA!].
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confronting her husband about the other woman, Raheleh was threatened and
beaten.7  In an attempt to calm her, Raheleh was given some pills by her
husband.8 Raheleh, while feeling the effects of the pills and her distraught state,
proceeded to attack her resting husband with a steel pipe, later proclaiming, "I
didn't know who I was beating with that steel pipe. I saw him as a monster .... I
was terrified.
9
Cases like Raheleh's are not uncommon in the Islamic Republic of Iran as
Iran uses the death penalty more than any other country, apart from China.
10
Iranian authorities see capital punishment as a deterrent to crime. I 1 According to
one local judiciary official, Hoda Torshizi, the use of the death penalty is for
security: "[b]y implementing God's law, we are increasing security in society
and we are sending a message... [to] those who break the law."' 12  Iran's
reliance on the death penalty continues a growing tradition for the Islamic
state. 13 It comes as no surprise that Iran recently opposed the abolition of the
death penalty during a vote on the United Nations General Assembly
resolution.14  What is surprising is that the United States also opposed the
7. Id. (reporting that Raheleh had just given birth to her second child less than two months
prior to the incident. Additionally, Raheleh appeared to suffer from post-partum depression from
the birth of her child as well as battered-women's syndrome from the years of abuse at the hands of
her senior husband. However, despite this information about her mental state Raheleh was still
found guilty of pre-meditated murder and sentenced to death).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Iran hangs 13, including mother: Reports, HAABA,
http://www.haaba.com/news/2008/01/01/7-70503/iran-hangs-i 3-including-mother-reports.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter HAABA].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Fathi, supra note 2 (reporting that Iran hanged 298 people in 2007 compared to 177 in
2006).
14. Id.; see also Maggie Farley, U.N. adopts death penalty moratorium, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2007, at All (reporting that the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a moratorium on
the death penalty with a 104- 54 vote. This vote was opposed by the United States, China, Iran,
and others charging that this interfered with country sovereignty. This moratorium was a victory
to those that want to abolish the death penalty despite the fact that on two previous occasions'
similar votes failed, 1994 and 1999. Proponents concluded that the resolution was adopted
because "[t]here is no conclusive evidence of the death penalty's deterrence value and ... any
miscarriage or failure of justice in the death penalty's implementation is irreversible and
irreparable."; UN General Assembly approves resolution calling for death penalty moratorium,




abolition of the death penalty, joining in a strange alliance with Iran. 15 This
raises the question of how the United States, as a democratic state, can agree
with a fundamentalist Islamic nation like Iran on employing the death penalty. 16
This comment discusses the background, court structure, and the role of
discretion in applying the death penalty in the Shari'a based criminal system of
Iran. This comment also discusses the state of the death penalty in the United
States. Few developed countries retain the operation of the death penalty as an
act of punishment like the United States and Iran. 17 These two nations have
different legal systems, histories, and standards for when the death penalty is
appropriate, but with the same outcome of state sanctioned death. The
international view of the death penalty is to abolish the practice, 18 and its
continued implementation by the United States and Iran will be criticized.
Ultimately, if the death penalty continues to be used in Iran it would benefit the
country to modernize its legal system to a process similar to the United States
with guided discretion in a bifurcated trial system. This modernization would be
similar to other Islamic nations that have supplemented the law of Islam
(Shari'a) within European modeled codes. 19 However, as a result of the 1979
revolution, the current political position of Iran is a fundamentalist theocracy,
and the ruling regime will most likely not change in the near future.
Section II of this comment takes a general look at the background and
history of Iran and its use of Shari'a law. The discussion will focus on the
effects of the regime change, from the modernist Pahlavi reign to the
fundamentalist Islamic Republic of Iran and then to Iran's legal and court system
after the 1979 Revolution. Further, this section discusses the background and
state of the death penalty in the United States. The discussion will focus on the
use of the death penalty in the United States before and after the 1972 case of
Furman v. Georgia. Section III will discuss the rights of defendants and the
discretion that governs the ultimate decision of seeking the death penalty. The
discussion will juxtapose the two legal systems with regard to procedure and
prosecutorial discretion within the systems.
Section IV focuses on the case of Raheleh Zamani and will discuss her case
as it theoretically would have progressed through each legal system and the
15. See Fathi, supra note 2; Farley, supra note 14 (noting that the U.S. joined China, Iran,
Sudan, and Syria in opposing the moratorium on the use of the death penalty); Moratorium, supra
note 14.
16. Farley, supra note 14.
17. See Fathi, supra note 2; Farley, supra note 14; Moratorium, supra note 14.
18. See Farley, supra note 14; Moratorium, supra note 14.
19. HAMID R. KUSHA, THE SACRED LAW OF ISLAM 289 (2002) [hereinafter KUSHA, SACRED]
(noting that the majority of Islamic nations do not strictly adhere to a fundamentalist view of the
Shari'a as does Iran and Saudi Arabia. Also, the author notes that because of modem capitalism
and interaction, an institutionalization of the Shari'a is almost impossible.).
2008]
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possible outcomes. Section IV also explores how modernization of Iran's legal
system, to one similar to the United States, would help to alleviate concerns of
inconsistent and arbitrary application of the death penalty by taking discretion
out of the hands of the victimized families and channeling the relevant
information of the crime and criminal within a bifurcated trial. With a process
similar to one utilized by the United States, the likelihood of arbitrary
application of the death penalty in Iran would be narrowed by limiting the
criminals subject to the death penalty. Finally, this section will conclude with
why Iran will most likely not modernize its legal system or re-structure its court
system to reflect a more westernized legal approach due to its history and
fundamentalist ruling regime.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant History of Iran
Muslim Arabs arrived in Persia, now the Islamic Republic of Iran, with
Islamic notions of justice and law. Muslim rulers were deemed to follow a
model of justice, law, and punishment that the Qur'an (Koran) advised. 21 The
Koran, along with the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and Shi'i
Imams, is the primary source for Islamic Sacred Law or Shari'a. 22 Shari'a is the
Arabic name for Islamic legal tradition.23 The sacrosanct nature of the Shari'a,
as viewed by Islamic jurists, is due to the belief that Allah, as the absolute
creator, is the supreme authority on true judgment. 24 Before the modernization
of Iran's legal system under Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah, known as
the Pahlavi Era, Iran used the dictates of Shari'a law to govern their daily lives.
25
The complex tradition embodied in the Shari'a seeks to strike a balance between
law, justice, and morality in dealing with the criminally accused.26 Today only
two countries strictly follow Islam's sacred law, the Islamic Republic of Iran and
20. HAMID R. KUSHA, CRIME AND CRIME CONTROL: A GLOBAL VIEW 83, 85 (Gregg Barak ed.,
2000) [hereinafter KUSHA, CRIME].
21. Id. at 86 (noting that the Koran is Islam's sacred text and primary source underlying the
Shari'a. Additional sources underlying the Shari'a are the sayings (hadith) and deeds (sunna) of
the Prophet Muhammad and Shi'i Imams, juristic or judicial opinions (ra'y) based on human
rationality ('aql) and analogy (qiyas)).
22. Id.
23. HAMID R. KUSHA, DEFENDANT RIGHTS 120 (2004) [hereinafter KUSHA, DEFENDANT].
24. KuSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 62 (2002) (noting that Islamic judges are believed to
encompass the aspects of Allah with regard to his guidance, justice, righteousness and judgment in
order to properly adjudicate legal matters. "[A]n Islamic judge must be impartial and of the
highest moral integrity, schooled in prophetic precedents in the application of the law").
25. MEHRANGIS KAR, Shari'a Law in Iran, in RADICAL ISLAM'S RULES 41 (Paul Marshall ed.,
2005).
26. KUSHA, DEFENDANT supra note 23, at 120.
[Vol. 16:1
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the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; other Islamic countries have adopted modem
constitutional laws and procedures. 27 Although Iran has a long and cultured
history, the events of the last century have culminated in the strict fundamentalist
nature of present day Iran.
28
1. Pahlavi Era
To understand how Iran has come to be an ardent user of the Shari'a one
has to understand the relevant history of the last century. 29  The process of
secularizing the legal system in Iran began with the Iranian Constitution of 1906
and the first Iranian Penal Code of 1912.30 Modernism, in the legal sense, took
hold in Iran during the Pahlavi Era beginning in 1925. 3 1 During this era and the
reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, a separation of the judiciary and the religious
establishment created fundamental changes. Reza Shah enacted laws that drew
upon the Islamic tradition of Shari'a as well as modem aspects of legal
practice. 33 Under Reza Shah's rule, little was done to establish human rights or
a democracy, but the expansion of education and reform of women's rights had
begun.34  This expansion of rights, particularly women's rights, directly
challenged the Shari'a dictate that a woman is not equal to a man in the eyes of
the law.35 During the Pahlavi era, the judiciary came to recognize three types of
modem law including civil, criminal, and administrative. 36  This movement
upset the fundamentalist pro-Shari'a groups who used the liberation of women
against Reza Shah, forcing him to abdicate in 1941. 37 Reza Shah's son, Shah




28. See S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 51-59 (Royston Limited 1985) (noting that
the author goes through extensive eras of the influence of Islam on the country of Iran).
29. Id. at 57.
30. Id. (noting that Iranian laws, in the early twentieth century, were inspired and imported
from European countries. Adolph Pierny, a French jurist, drafted the first Iranian Penal Code).
31. KAR, supra note 25, at 45.
32. Id. (noting that some of the most sensitive and pivotal changes that were made under Reza
Shah were in the realm of women's rights. The rights of women to be unveiled, be educated, and
enter the workforce created tension and confrontation from the pious pro-Shari'a groups. Under
the auspices of protecting and honoring Muslim women, these groups gained support from the
fundamentalists of Iran. They attacked the modernization of the country and legal system under
Reza Shah forcing him to abdicate his throne in 1941.).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 46.
35. KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 130.
36. Id. at 134.
37. KAR, supra note 25, at 45.
38. Id.; AMIN, supra note 28, at 60.
20081
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Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, like his father before him, attempted to
adapt foreign models of law into a workable system in Iran. 39 However, the
underlying premise based on foreign models was not adaptable to practice in
Iran.40 The Pahlavi shahs did not respect the Iranian justice system, which was
based on these foreign models. 4 1  This oversight, along with the foreign
influence behind their power and use of the judiciary as a political instrument,
ultimately led to revolution.
42
2. Islamic Republic of Iran
Revolution resulted from the tensions in Iran between the modernists, who
backed the Pahlavi regime, and the Shari'a fundamentalists in 1979.43 The
Shari'a fundamentalists were able to overthrow the Pahlavi dynasty by
proclaiming that they were fighting for freedom and protecting Islam.
Additionally, the revolution had popular support from groups outside of the
fundamentalists due in part to the perceived corruption of the Pahlavi regime.
45
The victory of the fundamentalists, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, ended a century-
long struggle waged between the modem Western movement and Islamic
revivalists.
After the revolution, the principles of the Shari'a became the basis for the
law of Iran and, subsequently, the tools of oppression.47 The Khomeini regime
was able to control nearly all aspects of the Iranian people's lives through the use
of violent measures and punishments.48  This power was reinforced and
strengthened through Iran's Constitution, ratified in 1979. 49 The Constitution
39. KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 139.
40. Id. (noting that the basis for the Iranian criminal code were the Napoleonic code used by the
French, but the concepts in France were based on the French Judiciary rather than a traditionally
Islamic nation).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 139-40; Louise Halper, Law, Authority, and Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iran, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 1137, 1163-64 (2007) (noting that by the seventies, the Pahlavi dynasty was seen as
pursuing the interest of their supporters such as the United States and its elite while neglecting the
plight of its poor).
43. KAR, supra note 25, at 46.; AMIN, supra note 28, at 62.
44. KAR, supra note 25, at 46 (noting that the new regime used slogans and rhetoric to suppress
the modernity of the Pahlavi era of rule).
45. KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 139-40; Halper, supra note 42, at 1163-64.
46. Rose Marie Karadsheh, Creating an International Criminal Court: Confronting the
Conflicting Criminal Procedures of Iran and the United States, 14 DICK J. INT'L L. 243, 264
(1996).





proclaimed the Shi'a school of Islamic law the primary law source in Iran 50 and
the supreme jurisprudent, Ayatollah Khomeini, as the most senior political figure
in Iran.51 Under Articles 4 and 170 of the new Constitution, all secular laws that
conflicted with Islamic norms and the Shari'a were not enforceable. 52 Where the
laws conflicted with the Shari'a or where the Shari'a was silent, the Iranian
courts were directed to enforce the juridical views of Ayatollah Khomeini. 53
Additionally, Iran's Supreme Court, under the direction of Khomeini, abolished
the judicial system that was established under the Pahlavi regime because the
laws and the system were not based on Shari'a law.54  Khomeini further
empowered the ruling regime in 1988 by declaring that the Islamic state was an
absolute trusteeship of the Prophet.55  This ruling explicitly declared that the
Muslim ruler was ordained by God to stand above all divine ordinances, even the
most basic rules, if it was in the best interest of the Muslim people and state.
56
Under Khomeini's reign and the newly ratified constitution, Iran established a
theocratic state where the illusion of civil rights, passage of laws, and even the
ability to participate in the government were all conditioned on "conformity with
Islamic standards."
' 57
50. AMIN, supra note 28, at 62.
51. EcON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD., COUNTRY PROFILE: IRAN 8 (2007).
52. AMIN, supra note 28, at 63; Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Isla'mai Iran [The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran] 1358 art. 4, 170 [1980] (stating the relevant text as follows:
Article 4
All civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political,
and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle
applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to
all other laws and regulations, and the fuqah,' of the Guardian Council are
judges in this matter.
Article 170
Judges of courts are obliged to refrain from executing statutes and regulations of
the government that are in conflict with the laws or the norms of Islam, or lie
outside the competence of the executive power. Everyone has the right to
demand the annulment of any such regulation from the Court of Administrative
Justice.)
[hereinafter Iran Constitution].
53. See AMIN, supra note 28, at 63 (noting that the juridical views of Ayatollah Khomeini are
known asfatwas. These views, although transitory in nature until the Majlis (legislature or general
assembly) could pass new legislation, in practice became the law in Iran.).
54. See KUSHA, CRIME supra note 20, at 97-98 (noting that Iran's Supreme Court is the Judicial
Council and as the secular laws were deemed null and void so were the courts).
55. SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 210 (2003).
56. Id.
57. KAR, supra note 25, at 51.
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3. Crime & Punishment in the Islamic Republic of Iran
The Islamic regime under Ayatollah Khomeini has held a monopoly on the
judicial power in Iran since taking control in 1979. The area of crime and
punishment saw a return to the Islamic model of the medieval period in Iran as
the categories of the criminal justice system were organized by behaviors that
violate God's law and the general public's rights.
5 9
In addition, crimes are further distinguished as either pardonable or non-
pardonable. 6 0 The distinction is that crimes against God, such as anti-state or
anti-Islamic activities, are non-pardonable whereas crimes against the general
public are pardonable. 6 1 Furthermore, the type of crime committed determines
the type of punishment that is applicable and conforms to the Shari'a. 62 In 1982,
the Parliament of Iran implemented four types of punishment in accordance with
the Shari'a: the hudud (boundaries), the qisad (retaliation), the diyyat (blood
money), and the t'a zirat (corporal). The codification of Shari'a law into the
Law of Islamic Punishments was initially implemented for a five year trial
64period. In 1991, the Islamic Parliament approved an Islamic Penal Code of
Iran which was subsequently ratified later that same year.65 This codification of
Shari'a law added a fifth category of punishments as Article Twelve of Iran's
Islamic Criminal Law calls for deterrent punishments. 66 Deterrent punishments
are imposed by the government in order to maintain public order.67 Punishments
in this fifth category are similar to t'a zirat in that the punishment forms can
range from imprisonment and fines to flogging.
68
58. KUSHA, CRIME supra note 20, at 98.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (noting that these crimes are mentioned only because the current political regime of Iran
has deemed these crimes as crimes against God. In addition, the person who is convicted of these
types of crimes is considered to be a Muharib or "one who wages war against God." These crimes
also are subject to the death penalty.).
62. KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 160-62.
63. Id. at 157; KUSHA, CRIME supra note 20, at 98-99 (noting that qisad or retaliation is the
equivalent to lex talionis or "a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, and a life for a life").
64. ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 208-09 (noting that it is difficult to judge how the penal code is
applied in post revolutionary Iran. It is difficult to obtain detailed information from adjudicated
cases due to the lack of statistics on frequency of penalty applications. Most of the information,
including the penal code, comes from secondary sources like human rights groups.).
65. Majmua-hi Qava'nini Jaza'l [Code of Criminal Laws] [Islamic Penal Code of Iran] 1991
(Iran); Mehr.org, Islamic Penal Code of Iran, http://mehr.org/IslamicPenalCode.oflran.pdf
(last visited Feb. 06, 2008).
66. Majmua-hi Qava'nini Jaza'l [Code of Criminal Laws] [Islamic Penal Code of Iran] 1991
art. 12, § 5 (Iran).




a. Shari 'a Punishments
The hudud, or the singular hadd, are punishments for crimes against
boundaries established by the Koran as God's laws ranging from adultery and
homosexuality to drinking alcoholic beverages. 69 The punishment for hudud
crimes range in application and severity depending on the crime and what the
Shari'a outlines as punishment; for example, the penalty for male homosexuality
is beheading where the penalty for female homosexuality is public flogging.
7 0
Qisad is a punishment for capital crimes that are retributive in nature and
follow the view of "a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, and a life for a life."
7 1
These crimes are categorized as crimes against a person or the public rather than
against God and require retributive punishments or compensation to the victim
or the victim's family. 72 The victim or his family may require the perpetrator to
either pay monetary compensation or suffer a similar loss comparable to the
damage caused by the crime committed.73 This category of punishment leaves
the government in the position of enforcing the punishment on behalf of the
victim within the guidelines of Shari'a. 74  When the crime is put into this
category of punishment, one's religious affiliation and gender become relevant,
as a Muslim male receives a less severe punishment than a non-Muslim male and
a female's life is less than that of a Muslim male.
75
The final two types of punishments promulgated by Shari'a law cover a
wider range of crimes for which lesser penalties are issued, but generally in a
harsh and degrading manner. 76  Diyyat cover crimes for which monetary
compensation would cover the injury inflicted upon another as a particular body
part is given a monetary value. Again the disparity between males and females
is evident as a male's organs are valued higher than a female's organs.77 The t'a
zirat covers a range of infractions from street crimes to white collar crimes. The
punishments for these crimes can be in the form of public flogging,S . 78
imprisonment, fines, or a combination. The Shari'a based code specifies exact
punishments for major crimes against God and the public, as determined by
Islam, while also setting limitations on crimes left to the discretion of Islamic
69. KUSHA, CRIME supra note 20, at 99.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 208.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. KUSHA, CRIME supra note 20, at 99.
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judges and courts. 79 The discretion and interpretation of the fractured judiciary
in Iran has led to arbitrary and inconsistent punishments, often without the right
to an appeal.
80
b. Shari 'a Judiciary
The role of the judiciary in Iran was not left unscathed by the regime
change because its structure underwent reorganization to conform to traditional
Shari'a principles. 8 1  The administration of justice is encompassed by and
provided oversight by the Ministry of Justice. 82 The Ministry of Justice is not a
part of the judicial branch, but a part of the executive branch. 83 According to
Article 160 of the 1979 Constitution, the Minister adjudicates issues that arise
between the executive, legislative, and the judicial branches. 84 Under the helm
of the Ministry of Justice, the judicial system is categorized into five categories
of courts, some of which have sub-courts. 85 The courts that adjudicate criminal
matters are broken into the Supreme Judicial Council, Court of Cassation,
79. AmIN, supra note 28, at 113.
80. See id. at 128-34 (detailing the court structure or lack thereof by listing the courts and
functions); see Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 266-272 (summarizing a general court structure for
Iran following the 1979 revolution).
81. See generally AMIN, supra note 28, at 128-29 (outlining the post-revolutionary
developments in the Iranian judiciary).
82. See id.; see also Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 268.
83. AMIN, supra note 28, at 129.
84. Iran Constitution, supra note 52, at art. 160 (quoting relevant language as follows:
"The Minister of Justice owes responsibility in all matters concerning the relationship between the
judiciary, on the one hand, and the executive and legislative branches, on the other hand.").
85. AMIN, supra note 28, at 130; see also Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 268-70 (noting that the
five distinct regular courts in operation in Iran are as follows:
Revolutionary Courts
Public Courts- 2 Subsets
Civil Courts
Criminal Courts
First Class Criminal Courts (Major Crimes)
Second Class Criminal Courts (Minor Crimes)
Courts of Peace
Ordinary Courts of Peace
Independent Courts of Peace (wider jurisdiction)
Special Civil Courts




Revolutionary Courts, and Public Courts that are divided into two classes of
criminal cases.
86
The Supreme Judicial Council has the ultimate authority over all judges in
Iran and interprets the Shari'a.87 The Court is made up of five members, all of
whom must be mujtahid or learned scholars of Islamic law. The Court is the
supreme authority of the judiciary in that it is charged with administering and
supervising the proper application and consistency of judgments of the lower
courts.89 In addition, the Supreme Judicial Council is the only appellate court
for a defendant who has been given the death penalty. 90 This limited appeal is in
accordance with Shari'a practiced by the Khomeini regime.
9 1
Below the Supreme Judicial Council are the Court of Cassation and the
special criminal courts known as the Revolutionary Courts. 92  The Court of
Cassation was the highest court of appeals before the 1979 revolution, but was
relegated to an intermediate appellate court afterwards. 93  The Court of
Cassation's main function is like the Supreme Judicial Council, as it
"supervise[s] the proper application of [the] laws by the lower courts." 94 The
Court of Cassation also tentatively adjudicates most criminal appeals, except for
cases involving the death penalty.
Unlike the Court of Cassation, the Revolutionary Courts were not holdovers
from pre-revolutionary Iran; these courts were promulgated during the interim
between the revolution and ratification of Iran's constitution. 96  The
Revolutionary Courts were political courts temporarily instituted to adjudicate
offenders who were deemed to have been counter-revolutionaries and a part of
the Pahlavi regime. 97 Although originally only a temporary measure, this court
became part of the judicial system in 1981 when the Iranian Parliament passed
the Administration of Justice Act which gave the Revolutionary Courts legal
status. The Revolutionary Courts now have a wide jurisdiction with the ability
86. Id.; Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 268-70.
87. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 268-69.
88. Id. at 268-69. (additionally, the Chief Justice and one other member are appointed by the
"Just Jurist" or Khomeini and his predecessors, while the other three members are elected by
sitting judges).
89. ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 200.
90. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 268-69.
91. Id.; ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 200.
92. ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 200; Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 268-69; AMIN, supra note 28,
at 130-31.
93. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 269.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. AMIN, supra note 28, at 130-31.
97. Id.; ZtBAIDA, supra note 55, at 200.
2008]
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to hear all criminal appeals, particularly in the area of political or religious
.98
opposition. The Revolutionary Courts also have the power of being a final
appellate court as there is no general right to an appeal. 99 This court has been
seen as a religious court due to the fact that its dominant judge is a religious
judge appointed by Khomeini and his predecessors. 100
The courts of first instance are known as the Public Courts and consist of
both civil and criminal courts. 10 1 All judgments, except imprisonment, handed
out by the criminal side are considered final and there is no right to an appeal.
10 2
The criminal court subset is divided into two classes: the First Class Criminal
Court and the Second Class Criminal Court. 103 The First Class court hears cases
involving major crimes for which death penalty appeals are heard by the
Supreme Judicial Council and imprisonment of more than two months are heard
by the Courts of Cassation. 104 The Second Class courts deal mainly with minor
crimes such as vagrancy so the penalties are much lighter, but still not worthy of
appeal. 105 Overall, the court system of Iran has become a confusing jumble as
different courts have been granted the ability to overstep jurisdictions and sit in
judgment without the absolute right to an appeal. 106
The Islamic concept of crime and punishment is different from Western
notions, such as that of the United States, because many times the subject of the
law is not just a single person but that person's family as well. Because
crimes such as murder are viewed as crimes against the family rather than
society, the family may seek retribution through qisad or compensation through
diyyat.108 The difference between the two is whether a person wants to inflict
punishment, such as the death penalty, on the transgressor or receive
compensation for the loss of the family member. 109 This system of vendettas
98. AMIN, supra note 28, at 130-31; ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 200; Karadsheh, supra note 46,
at 270.
99. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 270.
100. Id.
101. AMIN, supra note 28, at 131.
102. Id.
103. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 269.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 269-70.
106. AMIN, supra note 28, at 132; ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 200-01.
107. Nader Entessar, Criminal Law and the Legal System in Revolutionary Iran, 8 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 91,96 (1988).




and retaliation underlies the Shari'a and has for many years as the Shari'a of Iran
is considered supreme and permanent in the Iranian government.1
0
B. State of the Death Penalty in the United States
Among westernized democracies, the United States is the only country to
continue the tradition of implementing the death penalty.11' The death penalty
has been used in the United States since its inception, with the first recorded
execution occurring in 1608 and the first execution for murder in 1630.112 The
ur~adu1 jJena1l-y was a PractI i ,.u,,ina, America with indications of tolerance by
early Americans, as the Constitution lacked an express prohibition of its
practice." 3  Early use of the death penalty remained primarily in the hands of
states, as popular opinion and state legislators determined local development of
the practice. 114 However, the variations among death penalty legislation and
implementation declined after the international conflict of World War 11. 115
1. Pre-Furman
After World War II, the United States' use of the death penalty declined
• • - 116
much along the same lines as European countries of the same period. The
thought is that after the atrocities and the regime changes following the
conclusion of World War II, European countries lost the appetite for the death
penalty. 17 The United States continued the trend toward abolishment of the
death penalty until the late 1960s.1 8  In 1967, a moratorium on the death
penalty, lasting for a decade, was issued as federal courts sought to address the
principles and procedures associated with the practice of capital punishment.
19
110. See id. at 95-96 (noting that the author states that the purpose of the judiciary and
legislation of Iran is to codify and apply the laws of shari'a, not originate them).
111. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (2003).
112. Krista L. Patterson, Acculturation and the Development of Death Penalty Doctrine in the
United States, 55 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1224 (2006); RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 5 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that the first execution in 1608
was of George Kendall, who was a councilor for the colony of Virginia convicted of spying for the
Spanish and executed by firing squad, and the first execution for murder in 1630 was of a pilgrim
named John Billington, who died by hanging. Additionally, the first woman to be executed was
Jane Champion who was hung in James City, Virginia, in 1632.).
113. Patterson, supra note 112, at 1224.
114. Id. at 1224-27.
115. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 5.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 20.
118. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES
(2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/cpO6st.htm.
119. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 5.
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Although each state has its own substantive and procedural law in death
cases, the United States Supreme Court has become the pre-eminent authority on120
the procedures and circumstances used by the states. Each autonomous state
has the authority to implement its own specific death penalty statute within the
boundaries of the Constitution. 12 1  Although the Supreme Court seldom
considered death penalty cases prior to the 1970's, the Court took the
opportunity in 1972 to review death penalty statutes under the Eighth
Amendment. 122 After the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia123 the Supreme
Court, by requiring more structure and less arbitrariness in implementation,
invalidated all death penalty statutes that did not comply. 124 Most of the major
developments in the death penalty doctrine of the United States have since come
from the federal judiciary and not from state legislators, as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in Furman.
12 5
Following Furman, the Court worked to establish guidelines for the states
to follow "that would satisfy the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
,, 126
and unusual punishment" when implementing the death penalty. One of the
major problems which the Court in Furman tried to alleviate was the unbridled
discretion given to judges and juries in deciding who lives and dies. 127
Consequently, state legislatures, with little guidance, sought to draft a sentencing
scheme which limited the discretion of judges and juries in order to avoid
arbitrary and inconsistent sentences resulting from previous legislation. 128 In
response to Furman, many states drafted an extreme approach of removing
discretion from the jury and judge by implementing mandatory capital
sentencing for certain crimes.12 9
120. Id. at 9-10.
121. Louis J. PALMER, JR., THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 1 (1998).
122. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 9.
123. Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
124. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 9.
125. Patterson, supra note 112, at 1227.
126. Ariane M. Schreiber, States That Kill: Discretion and the Death Penalty - A Worldwide
Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263,289-90 (1996).
127. Id. at 290.
128. Id. at291.
129. Id. (noting that in response to the decision in Furman twenty-two states implemented
mandatory sentencing for certain crimes, which instead of causing the states to consider the




The states that did not use mandatory sentencing legislation tried to guide
the discretion by modeling legislation on the Model Penal Code section 210.6.130
In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's death penalty statute in Gregg v.
Georgia.131 Georgia's revised death penalty statute provided standards similar
130. Id. at 292- 93 (noting that the Model Penal Code approach used by a minority of states
sought to strike a balance between providing guidance for sentencing juries and discretion when
looking at factors unique to the particular defendant. Additionally, the author warrants that
"[p]erhaps if more of the states had drafted their death penalty legislation using the Model Penal
Code as a guide, the courts, including ultimately the Supreme Court, would not have increased
their involvement in capital sentencing discretion issues."); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.6(l)-(2)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (states in relevant parts:
(1) Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of murder, the
Court shall impose a sentence for a felony of the first degree if it is satisfied
that:
(a) none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Subsection (3)
of this Section was established by the evidence at the trial or will be established
if further proceedings are initiated under Subsection (2) of this Section; or
(b) substantial mitigating circumstances, established by the evidence at
the trial, call for leniency; or
(c) the defendant, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the
approval of the Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the first degree; or
(d) the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime; or
(e) the defendant's physical or mental condition calls for leniency; or
(f) although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not
foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.
(2) Determination by Court or by Court and Jury. Unless the Court imposes
sentence under Subsection (1) of this Section, it shall conduct a separate
proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced for a felony
of the first degree or sentenced to death....
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court
deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and
circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history,
mental and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. ...
... If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the Court shall dismiss
the jury and impose sentence for a felony of the first degree.
The Court, in exercising its discretion as to sentence, and the jury, in
determining upon its verdict, shall take into account the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) and any other
facts that it deems relevant, but it shall not impose or recommend sentence of
death unless it finds one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in
Subsection (3) and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances
sufficiently substantial to call for leniency ....
131. Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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to Model Penal Code section 210.6 in guiding the decision maker's discretion
rather than implementing a mandatory sentence of death for specified crimes. 1
32
The proposed 1962 draft of the Model Penal Code section 210.6 called for the
sentence of death only for the crime of murder and after a finding of at least one
aggravating circumstance that was not outweighed by any substantial mitigating
circumstances within a bifurcated trial. 1
33
2. Post-Furman
The three-member plurality in Gregg concluded that the Eighth
Amendment did not per se bar the death penalty as a means of punishment.13
4
The Court further upheld the Georgia death penalty statute as remedying the
arbitrary and capricious concerns expressed in Furman135 by providing for a
bifurcated trial where the sentencing authority is given relevant information to
guide the imposition of the sentence and standards to use this information. 136 In
addition, the Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina provided further
discretion to states by invalidating mandatory death penalty statutes under the
Eighth Amendment. 137 In a plurality opinion, the Court in Woodson explained
that a defendant's record, character, and the circumstances of the particular
offense must be considered to fulfill Furman's basic premise of replacing
arbitrary and misled sentencing discretion. 138 As a result of the death penalty
cases of the 1970's, guided discretion, in the confines of a bifurcated trial, has
empowered judges and juries to determine which capital defendants deserve the
death penalty only after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors during the139
punishment phase of a capital trial. Ultimately, the Supreme Court created the
basic Eighth Amendment parameters for states imposing the death penalty. 140
States were given a limitation on when the death penalty can be imposed, but
132. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 117.
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)-(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
134. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, SUpra note 112, at 143.
135. Id.; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-68 (The Georgia statute eliminated the arbitrary and capricious
elements of sentencing discretion by resembling the Model Penal Code statute's use of finding
aggravating circumstances, beyond a reasonable doubt. However, finding of an aggravating
circumstance did not require imposition of the death penalty).
136. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 143.
137. See Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (Justice Stewart explained that the
consideration of the character and record of each unique defendant and the circumstances of their
offense are constitutionally indispensable as part of the death penalty process.).
138. Id. at 303.
139. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 170-71.
140. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 295.
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retained discretion in considering the unique, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of the defendant and crime when giving the sentence of death. 1
4 1
a. Aggravating & Mitigating Factors
Since Furman and Gregg, the Supreme Court has articulated its preference
for guided discretion by allowing the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
factors during the sentencing phase of death penalty cases.142 In 1976, the Court
in Lockett v. Ohio143 indicated that a crucial element in capital cases is
individualized sentencing. 144  Within this system of guided discretion,
aggravating factors seek to differentiate which crimes are identified to receive
the harsher punishment of death, 14 5 while mitigating factors seek to differentiate
which defendants should receive punishment that is less than death. 1
46
The burden of proving any aggravating factor is on the prosecution during
the sentencing phase of the trial and can vary among the different
jurisdictions.14  However, before imposing a death sentence the sentencing
entity must find at least one aggravating factor. 148 Conversely, the burden of
introducin mitigating factors during the sentencing phase of the trial is on the
defendant. 149 Mitigating factors act to reduce the moral culpability of the
defendant to justify the jury imposing a lesser sentence than death. As a
general rule, the defendant may introduce any relevant evidence to justify not
being sentenced to death and may include statutory and non-statutory factors.
15 1
Although states may statutorily create mitigating factors, it may not limit a
defendant to only the statutory factors as was attempted in Lockett.'
52
141. Id.
142. Id. at 295-96.
143. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
144. Id. at 604-05 (writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stated, "Given that the
imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we
cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need
for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the
individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.").
145. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 329.
146. Id. at 389.
147. Id. at 329.
148. Id.; PALMER, supra note 121, at 97-98 (noting that statutory aggravating factors and special
circumstances in some jurisdictions are created by legislators. Additionally, there are two
conditions when a statutory aggravating factor is considered valid: 1) The factor must not be one,
"that could be applied to every defendant convicted of murder" 2) The factor must not be vague
that the jury would not understand it.).
149. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 389.
150. Id.
151. PALMER, supra note 121, at 115-16.
152. Id. at 115-17.
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In Lockett, the sentencing entity was required to implement the death
penalty unless the entity was able to find one of the three mitigating factors.
153
This limited range of mitigating factors was inconsistent with the Court's
constitutional requirements under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as it
worked to bar relevant evidence proffered by the defendant. 154 Accordingly, the
underlying rationale of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances is to
lessen the inconsistent and arbitrary application of the death penalty by
narrowing the class of felons who should receive the death penalty and
broadening the class who should not be put to death. 1
55
Although each state is allowed to choose the aggravating and mitigating
factors, within limits, the authority on the ultimate standard is still the Supreme
Court. 156 Throughout the 1980's, the Court sought to loosen its hold as the pre-
eminent authority on the substantive law and procedures incorporated in
implementing the death penalty. 157  However, this has come about less from
notions of federalism and more from the Court requiring clear evidence of
constitutional errors that a defendant has been prejudiced and the Court
determining how often a defendant may raise legal objections. 158
b. Right to Counsel
The ability of capital defendants to raise errors and legal objections as a
result of their death penalty trials can be hampered when they cannot retain
counsel on their behalf.1 Despite the Constitution, death penalty defendants
153. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607 (1978) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)
(West 1975)) (The mitigating factors are:
The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that
the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of
insanity.).
154. Id. at 608; PALMER, supra note 121, at 115-17 (noting the three Lockett principles as
follows:
A death penalty statute may create mitigating circumstances.
To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude
consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances.
Irrelevant mitigating circumstances may constitutionally be barred from use at
capital penalty phase proceedings.).
155. PALMER, supra note 121, at 116.
156. ZIMRNG, supra note 111, at 9.
157. Id. at 10.
158. Id.
159. See PALMER, supra note 121, at 92-93.
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were not guaranteed the right to counsel until the case of Gideon v.
Wainwright, 60 where the Supreme Court held that defendants have a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, and if they cannot afford counsel, the prosecuting
jurisdiction has to provide an attorney. 16 1 The Gideon ruling only required
counsel at the guilt phase of a capital proceedings bifurcated trial. 162 Criminals
obtained the right to counsel during the sentencing phase of a capital proceedings
bifurcated trial four years later in the case of Mempa v. Rhay. 16 Ultimately, the
Mempa ruling led to a requirement of a right to an attorney at any sentencing
... ... 164
portion of a hearing, even a hearing in a non-capital proceeding. The Court in
Mempa concluded that "the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the
facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and
assisting the defendant to present his case as to sentence is apparent."'
165
Without the right of counsel to present a defendant's case, even during the
sentencing phase, the defendant may lose some legal rights and be deprived due
process when his or her life hangs in the balance.
This section is a snapshot of the storied history of the death penalty in the
United States. Consequently, the focus has been on the essential constitutional
parameters of a bifurcated trial and guided discretion when a state seeks to
condemn a defendant to death. The states ultimately use their own substantive
law and procedures when putting a defendant to death and the state governor has
the ability to grant clemency to death row defendants by pardoning the
condemned.
6 7
III. APPLYING THE DEATH PENALTY
As noted earlier, the Iranian concept of criminal law is different from that
of the United States and other Western nations. 168 Due to the supremacy and
permanency of the Shari'a as a set of laws, appeal to familial vendettas, and
court system, the application of a death sentence in Iran will be different than a
death sentence in the United States. 169 Since the late 1970's, the death penalty
has been tempered by the United States Supreme Court following its decision in
Furman and administered by state legislators as they seek a constitutional death
160. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
161. PALMER, supra note 121, at 92.
162. Id. at 92-93.
163. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); PALMER, supra note 121, at 92-93.
164. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 136-37; PALMER, supra note 121, at 92-93.
165. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135.
166. See id. at 135-37.
167. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 296-99.
168. Entessar, supra note 107, at 96.
169. Id. at 95-96.
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penalty statute. 17  A noticeable difference seems to emerge between the two
systems. Even though both systems call for the death penalty in certain crimes,
the Iranian system seems more apt to apply the penalty in a more arbitrary and
inconsistent way due in part to Iran's Islamic legal system and the discretion
exercised by victims, victims' families, and Iranian judges. 171
A. Discretion and Death in Iran
In returning to the use of Shari'a, the new regime of Iran was hoping to
reshape Iran "into a moral and crime-free haven."' 7 2 However, the reality is that
Iran has become a crime-infested country with an increase in serious crimes and
misdemeanors. 173 This outcome is despite the often harsh and cruel punishments
associated with crime and punishment in the administration of Shari'a law.
174
This section will explore how the death penalty is instituted in Iran through its
laws, court system and judiciary.
1. Judicial Discretion of Punishment
Under Iran's criminal law, judges adjudicating crimes against God's law
have no discretion in applying punishment; they must apply the hadd or hudud
punishments as outlined in the Koran. 175 According to the law of Shari'a, some
of the crimes delineated in the Koran as requiring a punishment of hadd are
adultery, sodomy, homosexuality, consuming intoxicating liquors, and theft.
176
Peculiarly, the crimes of consuming intoxicating liquors, lesbianism, and
sodomy may all be punished with death. 177 According to Iran's criminal code
sodomy can be punished with the execution of the active parties, provided there
was consummation and no mitigating circumstances. 178  On the other hand,
170. ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 9.
171. See KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 157-65; KUSHA, CRIME supra note 20 at 100.
172. KUSHA, CRIME supra note 20, at 97.
173. Id. at 100-01; KuSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 175.
174. See KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 160.
175. Entessar, supra note 107, at 97 (noting that the Iranian authorities have rebutted criticism of
their harsh punishments as not wanting to treat a criminal as sick and the punishment as treatment
for their sickness, but as a lesson to other criminals. Ayatollah Ardabili, the Islamic Republic's
Chief Justice contends, "Islam teaches us that it is equally important to punish a lawbreaker, as a
punishment is considered to have three purposes - repentence [sic] of the crime, admonition to not
repeat it, and a lesson to others").
176. Id.; see Majmua-hi Qava'nini Jaza'l [Code of Criminal Laws] [Islamic Penal Code of Iran]
1991 (Iran).
177. See generally Majmua-hi Qava'nini Jaza'l [Code of Criminal Laws] [Islamic Penal Code of
Iran] 1991 (Iran) (noting that the translation is of the Iranian criminal code based on the Shari'a).
178. See id. (noting that according to Article I I l of the criminal code only mature, sane, and
consenting parties to sodomy will be executed. Additionally, the codes provide that only
consummation of the relationship would lead to execution on the first conviction, whereas mere
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female homosexuality and consuming alcohol are not summarily executable
crimes on the first offense. 179  However, a party that is convicted of female
homosexuality three times and received penance will be executed on the fourth
conviction. 18  Additionally, a party convicted of consuming alcoholic liquors
and given penance will be sentenced to execution on the third conviction. 181
Accordingly, an Islamic judge practices no discernible discretion when it comes
to implementing hadd punishments.
182
Similarly, Islamic judges also have a lack of discretion when doling out
punishments based on retribution or qisad crimes. 83 Qisad crimes date back to
conflicts between the Bedouin tribes that made up Iran when it was Persia.
184
These crimes are considered to be against the victim and his family, therefore the
victims have the choice to seek retribution through the infliction of the same
injury or from compensation of "blood money" known as diyyat.' 85
Conversely, Islamic judges do have a discernable amount of discretion
when it comes to implementing the lesser punishments provided under the t'a
zirat. 86 These punishments have no specific penalty as mentioned in the Koran
leaving the judge with sole discretion in punishment. 187  This discretion is
tempered by the criminal code as it limits the type of punishment available to
admonition, fines, or seizure of property. 188 However, this type of offense could
also include a public flogging sentence, which is often viewed as cruel
punishment. 1
89
When it comes to dispensing punishments of Shari'a, judicial discretion is
limited to applying the given law, not originating it. 19  However, the judiciary
and the ruling regime decide what the law is and how it is to be implemented
foreplay would require three convictions with penance before a death sentence would be
implemented).
179. See id.
180. See id. at art. 129, 131 (noting that the penance for lesbianism is one hundred lashes for
each party involved).
181. See id. at art. 168-81 (noting that penance for consuming alcoholic liquors is one hundred
lashes. However, a penance can be avoided by the accused by repenting his alleged crime before
any witnesses testify against him.).
182. Entessar, supra note 107, at 97.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 97-98.
185. Id. (noting the author points out that the Koran recommends forgiveness, because the act
pleases God. But the use of retribution is still allowed.).
186. Id. at 98.
187. Entessar, supra note 107, at 98.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 95.
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based on their interpretation of the Shari'a and the Iranian Constitution. 191 The
interpretation of what warrants due process and constitutional rights of Iranian
citizens is thus in the hands of the ruling regime and judiciary.192 As a result, the
ruling dictate is that society should adapt to the requirements of the interpreted
Shari'a law rather than society adapting an archaic system to modem needs of
Iran. 193
2. Defendant's Rights
Although Iran is a theocracy based on the Shi'a school of Islam, 194 it also
has a constitutional basis. 195 In the judicial process, this constitution has created
a number of rights guaranteed to a defendant.196 Among those are a presumption
of innocence, right to a ury, right to a speedy trial, and a right to representation
by competent counsel. 197 In addition, all arrests and searches and seizures are
subject to a valid warrant.' 98 However, in practice these rights, constitutionally
issued by Iran, are subject to conformity to the Shari'a as interpreted by the
ruling regime. 199 An example of the incongruity of tran's judicial process with
its constitutional guarantees is the right to a jury trial; in practice the judge acts
as the sole fact-finder and decision-maker. 20 Therefore, determining the
defendant's rights from the judicial process is limited by the actual process as the
constitution is subordinate to the interpretation of the Shari'a. 201
At trial the judge serves the dual role of determining facts and making final
decisions; Iran does not recognize a jury system. The decisions are
considered final as there is no general right to an appeal. However, where a
defendant is facing the death penalty or more than two months of imprisonment,
his case may be appealed. Only three forms of evidence are allowed in
191. See AMIN, supra note 28, at 63.
192. See KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 162-63.
193. AMIN, supra note 28, at 107 (noting that under Article 4 of Iran's 1979 Constitution all
branches of the state, be it legislative or executive, must be subordinate to the interpreted Shari'a
law).
194. Id. at 62.
195. Id.
196. See KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 162.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.at 162-63.
200. See Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 273.
201. See KUSHA, SACRED SUpra note 19, at 157, 162-63.
202. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 273.
203. Id.




,. • 205Iranian trials: religious oaths, eyewitness testimony, and confessions.
Evidence is limited because of the assumption that evidence of this type is
reliable. 206 A defendant can be requested to pledge an oath of innocence if the
plaintiff is unable to present enough evidence of a crime, which will dismiss the
case. 207 A confession, either in pretrial interrogation or in court, must be free
and voluntary and, "describe the criminal act in detail and must be corroborated
by other evidence."20 8  Theoretically, a confession obtained by coercion or
torture would be excluded at trial. 209 Lastly, eyewitness accounts are limited to
males of good Muslim character who can only testify to events directly
observed, thus making hearsay inadmissible.
210
There are two ways for a lawsuit to be initiated in Iran.2 11 Either the
plaintiff may allege a qisa crime, one which was committed against him or his
family, or the state may bring the suit in the case of a hudud or t'a zirat
offense. 2 12 If the plaintiff brought suit, the judge questions the accused about the
claim and requires the plaintiff to bear the burden of presenting evidence where a
defendant pleads not guilty. 213 For all other crimes, the state will initiate the
claim, beginning with pretrial investigations, if a crime is believed to have been
committed. One major aspect of the pretrial process is that a pretrial detention
is not thought to be necessary as flight is perceived to be difficult for the
accused.
215
Once the trial begins, the focus is on the judge and the litigants.2 16
Although the constitution guarantees the right to counsel, 2 17 this right depends
on the particular offense for which a defendant is accused.2 18  Counsel is
permitted in qisa and t'a zirat offenses, but is not permitted where the
205. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 272.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 273.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 271.
210. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 272-73 (noting that Muslim women are allowed to present
eyewitness testimony in limited cases of special knowledge such as virginity and birth.
Additionally, in these isolated instances, two women substitute as one man).
211. Id. at 270.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 271.
214. Id.
215. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 271.
216. Id. at 272.
217. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri'i Islam'mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran]
1358 art. 35 [1980].
218. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 272.
2008]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
punishment is the harshest, hudud crimes.219 However, a judge in any type of
trial encourages the litigants, even when represented by counsel, to give their
input. 220 Theoretically, this system affords the accused with due process rights,
but in reality the process can be manipulated by judges and the ruling regime. 22 1
Below is one example of blatant manipulation of the process.
22 2
Author Hamid R. Kusha has chronicled the power of the judiciary to
supplant the guaranteed rights of the defendant with their own sense of judgment
in a case adjudicated by the first judge, Khalkhali, whom Khomeini appointed
after the 1979 Revolution. 22 3 The daily Etellaat reported the following notice
sent out by the Public Relations Office of the Revolutionary Prosecutor:
This morning a communiqu6 was issued by the Public Relation Office of the
Revolutionary Prosecutor concerning convicts who have been arrested in
recent anti-revolutionary activities and for whom the verdict of the court has
been carried out, [this communiqu6 is] as follows: It is brought to the
attention of the families whose offspring... have been arrested in recent anti-
revolutionary events and against whom the verdict of the court has been
carried out: please contact the Central Office of the Evin Prison with
appropriate pictured birth certificates to identify your offspring whose
pictures have been published herewith in order to receive them. 224
The notice asked for the parents of the anti-revolutionaries to bring
identification of their offspring in order to receive their bodies. 225 Therefore, the
defendants, most of whom were juveniles, had not been identified prior.226
Kusha points out that the judge and participants in the execution of these teens
would have to claim the procedural protection of Islamic law that allows a
defendant to be executed for an alleged crime without being properly
identified. 227 Otherwise, under the tenets of Islam, these arbitrary executions
would be considered pre-meditated murder for which those involved could also
219. Id. (noting an exception to the general rule of no counsel, for hudud crimes involving theft
and defamation).
220. Id.
221. KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 162-64.
222. Id. at 163
223. KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 162-64 (noting that the first judge appointed by Khomeini
was Ayatollah Sadiq Khalkhali).






receive the death penalty. 22 8 None of those involved were ever reprimanded and
the judge, Khalkhali, was eventually elected to a seat in the parliament.
229
The preceding case involved juveniles who were participating in actions
against the government. 23  Even then, the process was patently subverted in
order to serve the interests of the fundamentalist regime.23 1 Likewise, a case like
Raheleh Zumani's would not be treated any differently and probably worse
because she is a female who murdered her husband.232 In Iran, being a female is
considered to be less than that of a male in the eyes of the law, particularly in the
payment of diyyat.
233
B. Discretion and Death in the United States
Since Furman, the Supreme Court has instituted constitutional parameters
which the states must configure their death penalty statutes to be administered
within.2 34 To remedy the arbitrariness in which the death penalty was imposed
prior to the decision in Furman, the Court devised a scheme in which sentencing
entities guided discretion of when to impose the death penalty based on
aggravating factors and when death would be too severe a penalty based on
mitigating factors. 235  However, sentencing entities, be it judge or jury, have
discretion in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors according to the




229. KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 163-65. Khalkhali went on to be elected to a seat in
parliament. When asked how he could be in charge of the whole judiciary of Iran, presumably in
conflict with Islam, Khalkhali said:
Nonsense. How is it that there can be the Imam or a president for the whole
country, but not a judge? Even if there is such a law in Islam my case is an
exception. On Imam Khomeini's orders, I became the Islamic judge of Iran.
The Imam is the only person I take orders from and report back to. I went to
every part of this country. I executed, imprisoned, and confiscated. I have done
the job of eight judges. All the others have one jurisdiction, while I covered
eight regions.
Id.
230. Id. at 163-64.
231. See id.
232. See KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 259 (noting that when a Muslim male murders a
Muslim woman upon his execution he is entitled to blood money whereas the same is not true if a
Muslim woman murders a Muslim male).
233. See id.
234. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 290-91.
235. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 329, 389.
236. PALMER, supra note 121, at 130-33 (noting that there are two types of sentencing phase
determination of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors: Weighing and Non-weighing
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As the death penalty is currently valid under the Constitution, the ultimate
discretion of whether or not the death penalty will be sought to punish a criminal
is in the hands of state legislators and governors. 23 7 The death penalty statutes,
which determine the process and what statutory aggravating and mitigating
factors can be argued, govern the process and how convicted capital criminals
will be punished. 38 However, the discretion to seek the death penalty lies in the
hands of the prosecutor, who also holds the ability to negotiate and accept plea
bargains for which a lesser penalty is normally given.23 9 Once the death penalty
has been authorized, normally by state statute, and sought as a means of
punishment, by prosecutorial discretion, it is up to the discretion of the
sentencing entity to determine whether the criminal deserves the punishment of
death based on the circumstances of the crime and the criminal.24 Finally, the
last level of discretion ultimately is held by the President of the United States or




The prosecutor's ability to influence any adjudication is apparent from his
discretion to charge and plea bargain. 24 2 It is unlikely that this discretion will
change, as the Supreme Court has held that the decision to prosecute or not and
the belief that an accused committed an offense, based on probable cause, is
generally in the prosecutor's discretion.24 3  This discretion is limited by the
Constitution and statute as a prosecutor shall not discriminate based on race or
become vindictive in their prosecutions. 244 Equally, a prosecutor may choose to
not seek the death penalty, even where a statute may allow the imposition of
jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions required only that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors
or that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors. Conversely, standard of proof jurisdictions
required either that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors by preponderance of the
evidence or in some jurisdictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Here the prosecutor has the burden
of proof of proving that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt which is favorable to capital defendants. In non-weighing jurisdictions the
factfinder merely has to consider the sufficiency of the circumstances. Three different methods of
non-weighing has developed: sufficiency of mitigating factors, mitigating not sufficient beyond a
reasonable doubt, and determination of whether mitigating exist).
237. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 301.
238. See id. at 301-03.
239. Id. at 301-02.
240. See id. at 303.
241. Id. at 297-98.





death.24 5 However, a prosecutor's discretion can be tempered by his political
ambitions and the public's view of the use of the death penalty. 246 A prosecutor
is more likely to seek the death penalty where support of the punishment is high,
the crime Farticularly heinous, and the criminal generally unknown to the public
at large./
24
2. Sentencing Entity Discretion
Once a capital trial has reached the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial the
discretion to impose the death penalty remains with the sentencing entity, be it
judge or jury.248 There is no constitutional right to a jury trial during the penalty
phase of a capital proceeding; however, a majority of jurisdictions that still use
the death penalty utilize a twelve person jury.249 This jury can be the same jury
as used at the guilt phase of a capital proceeding. 2 5  Similarly, there is no
constitutional right to have a unanimous jury; nevertheless a majority of courts
require either a unanimous or a majority vote on when death is appropriate.251
The discretion of the jury as a sentencing entity is limited by legislation in
accordance with the constitutional parameters of the death penalty.2 52 Despite
specific legislation that dictates statutory requirements when weighing
aggravating and mitigating factors, sentencing juries retain broad discretion in
this area since categories of mitigating factors tend to be very broad, and juries
in many states are not required to explain their decision. 253 This broad discretion
may open the door to arbitrary or inconsistent applications of the death penalty,
but the risk is much less than before Furman.
254
As there is no constitutional right to a jury at the penalty phase of a capital
proceeding, some cases are tried to the judge as the fact-finder during this
245. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 301-02.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 301 n.210 (noting the author's comparison of the O.J. Simpson and the Susan Smith
case. Here the author notes that where the criminal was known, O.J. Simpson, and the crime of
murder committed in California the prosecutors elected to not seek the death penalty. On the other
hand, in South Carolina the death penalty was sought where a relatively unknown woman was
accused of drowning her children).
248. See PALMER, supra note 121, at 85-92.
249. Id. at 89-90.
250. Id. at 90.
251. Id.
252. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 303.
253. Id.
254. Id. (noting that the ultimate decision to decide life and death is with the jury; however,
some states allow a judge to overrule a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment with the death
penalty).
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phase.255 In some cases, a defendant may waive his right to a jury during the
penalty phase.2 56  Additionally, some jurisdictions prohibit juries during the
penalty phase, thereby prohibiting the jury per se and choosing to adhere to
common law principles of investing sentencing discretion solely with the
judge. 257 Other courts seek to strike a balance by having a panel of three judges
determine the punishment of convicted defendants.
258
Although the United States death penalty process may be open to arbitrary
and inconsistent sentences, as the Supreme Court and states seek to strike a
balance between guided discretion and individualized consideration of each
criminal, the process has improved in these respects since Furman. Despite the
fact that any moratorium of the death penalty was lifted after Furman, the
frequency in which the death penalty has been used in the United States is lower
now than ever before. 259 Accordingly, the discretion juries and judges exert over
the determination of life and death may seem unfettered; however, the reality is
that this discretion has already been limited by constitutional and legislative
guidelines.
260
IV. THE CASE OF RAHELEH ZAMANI
The story of Raheleh Zamani is an unfortunate case of a battered woman
reaching the end of her ability to withstand the abuse and philandering of her
husband.26 1 Raheleh was convicted of pre-meditated first degree murder of her
husband.262 Raheleh was executed on January 1, 2008 despite efforts seeking a
continued stay of execution to allow time to persuade Raheleh's in-laws to
accept a payment of diyyat for the life of their slain son. 263 This payment of
diyyat would have paved the way for Raheleh to escape the gallows of Evin
prison and possibly to see her children grow into adults.
2 64




259. Patterson, supra note 112, at 1228 (noting a quote from Raymond Paternoster which the
author relies upon asserting, "Since the reinstatement of capital punishment only a handful of
offenders have been executed each year." This decline is allocated to the Supreme Court
restricting capital punishment, the discretion of judges and jurors, and legislative and executive
action on behalf of the states.).
260. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 304.
261. SAVE DELARA!, supra note 6.
262. Id.
263. HAABA, supra note 10.
264. See Majmua-hi Qava'nini Jaza'l [Code of Criminal Laws] [Islamic Penal Code of Iran]
1991 art. 257 (Iran) (noting that in the case of premeditated murder retaliation can be reduced to
compensation of blood money by the agreement of the victim's heirs).
[Vol. 16:1
DISCRETIONARY DEATH
A. In the System
The case of Raheleh Zamani and the majority of Iranian cases, from
interrogation and arrest to trial and appeal, are not public record.
265
Consequently, what rights or procedures were afforded to her and others before
their deaths cannot be ascertained. 266  But, a comparative analysis of the
theoretical rights and procedures afforded by Iran and the rights and procedures
that would have been afforded by the United States to Raheleh Zamani can
distinguish the two criminal systems regarding the implementation of the death
penalty.
1. Pre-Trial
Raheleh Zamani's crime would be categorized as a qisad crime, requiring
the family of her late husband to exercise prosecutorial discretion by bringing
forth a complaint. 26 7 The complaint would have come before a court of first
appearance and due to the severity of the crime, before the First Class Criminal
Court. 26 8 Raheleh would then be questioned concerning the claim, permitting
269her to either confess and admit guilt or deny the claim. Any affirmative
defense on Raheleh's behalf would be limited to her providing evidence to prove
that her husband deserved to die according to Islamic jurisprudence, thus
limiting her plight as a battered spouse to the discretion of the court of what
evidence is in accordance with the Shari'a. 270 If Raheleh pled not guilty, the
matter would commence in a trial and during the time between accusation and
adjudication Raheleh would not be subject to pre-trial detention.2 7 1 Raheleh also
has a theoretical right to retain counsel on her behalf, but there is no evidence
that the right includes an attorney at an appeal or where she cannot afford one.
272
In the United States, the pre-trial process would differ from Iran in that the
state, through a prosecutor and pursuant to state statutes, would have the
265. See AMIN, supra note 28, at 66.
266. See id.
267. SAVE DELARA!, supra note 6.
268. See AMIN, supra note 28, at 130-32.
269. See Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 270-71.
270. See Majmua-hi Qava'nini Jaza'l [Code of Criminal Laws] [Islamic Penal Code of Iran]
1991 art. 226 (Iran) (noting that the article seems to read that the Islamic judge, as the fact finder,
would determine whether or not Raheleh's husband deserved to die and not on any affirmative
defenses such as battered women's syndrome or post-partum depression. Accordingly it is unclear
whether Iran recognizes these defenses, or even self-defense, in the country's jurisprudence.);
Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 272 (noting that evidence is limited to religious oaths, confessions,
and Muslim male eyewitnesses).
271. See Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 271.
272. Id. at 276.
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discretion to commence the action. 273 Raheleh would most likely be detained
upon an indictment and charged with the crime if enough evidence is presented
to warrant probable cause. 274 Similar to Iran, Raheleh would have the right to
retain counsel; however, according to Gideon and Mempa she would be
guaranteed that right even where she would be unable to afford one. 275 In
addition, Raheleh would have an opportunity to either enter a plea admitting her
guilt or innocence and a determination of the verdict by plea, the court, or a
276jury. Even if Raheleh were to admit her guilt at this stage, she would be able
to present evidence of her past abuse as mitigating evidence during the
sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial.
277
2. Trial
In Iran, the focal point of the trial would be the litigants and the judge.278
The evidence would be limited to religious oaths, confessions, and
• 279
eyewitnesses. As the fact-finder and decision-maker, the judge would weigh
the evidence presented and determine the guilt or innocence of Raheleh.
2 80
Once found guilty, Raheleh's fate would be determined by her deceased
husband's family.2 8 1 The family would have sole discretion over Raheleh's
punishment, but their right would be to seek retribution by allowing the state to
execute her.2 82 The other option for the family would be to seek monetary
compensation from Raheleh in the form of diyyat, which would absolve her of
the crime.
283
In the United States, the criminal proceeding would be separated into a
bifurcated trial with the first phase to determine Raheleh's guilt and the second
phase, if necessary, to determine her punishment after a weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating factors of the case.2 84 Throughout this process, the
prosecution would retain the discretion to negotiate a plea deal with Raheleh
273. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 173.
274. Id.
275. PALMER, supra note 121, at 92-93; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963);
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1967).
276. PALMER, supra note 121, at 81-83.
277. Id. at 86.
278. Karadsheh, supra note 46, at 272.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 273.
281. Entessar, supra note 107, at 97-98.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 143.
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which could spare her death.2 85 If found guilty, the punishment phase of the trial
would proceed along the same lines of the guilt phase as the aggravating and
mitigating factors would be weighed at the discretion of the sentencing entity
determining whether Raheleh deserved death or a lesser sentence. In a
bifurcated trial system, Raheleh's case would receive more due process as she is
able to present mitigating evidence, even if found guilty during the first phase of
the trial. 287 This mitigating evidence would allow the sentencing entity, be it
judge or jury, to lessen the class of criminals subject to death by individualizing
the sentencing process. 288  Lastly, an additional protection for Raheleh in
proceeding through her capital trial is that she would have a right to retain
counsel or compel the prosecutor to provide her one in order to marshal the facts
and process so that she exercises her legal rights.
289
Essentially, there is no constitutional right to an appeal, but where a state
has granted a right to an appeal, by statute, then constitutional protections
attach. 29  Therefore, Raheleh would be able to appeal a judgment against her at
.... 291
either the guilt or sentencing phase of her trial. Additionally, Raheleh
originally would not have a right to counsel upon an appeal under the Sixth
Amendment, but the Court determined that due process may be violated where a
state is not required to provide counsel to indigents when it grants a right to an
appeal. 292 As a last resort, Raheleh may be able to seek a pardon or clemency
from the governor of the prosecuting state.
293
285. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 301 n.210, 302 (noting that although Rahelch is not a famous
sports star, her plight in dealing with an abusive husband combined with post-partum depression
and medication may lead strong public support for her and the prosecutor to not seek the death
penalty and more likely negotiate a plea deal for a lesser sentence. Conversely, Raheleh may
arouse more sentiment than Susan Smith where Raheleh's crime was against an abusive,
philandering husband and not against her own children.).
286. Id. at 303.
287. See PALMER, SUpra note 121, at 116.
288. Id.
289. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.128, at 135; PALMER, supra note 121, at 92-93.
290. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 607-08; see PALMER, supra note 121, at 137-39
(noting that a State is not required to provide appellant review of a death sentence, however, all
jurisdictions do provide some type of appellate review).
291. See PALMER, supra note 121, at 137-39.
292. Id. (noting that the right to counsel in an appeal is only required for an indigent's first
appeal, thus Raheleh would be given at least one appeal with counsel).
293. Schreiber, supra note 126, at 297-99 (noting that the Constitution does not require
clemency and the states have seemingly unfettered discretion in the clemency process. Despite
this discretion, states must abide by due process and equal protection rights that ensure the
procedures utilized are fair.).
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3. Conclusion of Analysis
Raheleh Zamani ultimately was executed on January 1, 2008, despite
efforts to obtain a stay of execution in order to seek a possible payment of
diyyat.29 4 Once more the arrest, trial, and execution were not public; therefore
any rights she may have been afforded as a criminal are not apparent. 295 The
limitations on the type of evidence she may present and when she can present it,
as well as the discretion of the victim's family in ordering her execution, are not
enough evidence to determine whether she was arbitrarily executed by Iran.
296
However, the process taken as a whole continues to be a target of human rights
groups that claim Iran, by these processes, arbitrarily and inconsistently
implements the death penalty.
297
If Raheleh's case had happened in the United States, it is debatable whether
she would have been indicted for her crime or granted a lesser sentence in plea
negotiations. 298  However, had her case gone to trial, the courts would have
protected her rights as a citizen with a guarantee of counsel, an ability to sway
the jury with evidence of her situation, and it would have allowed a jury of her
peers to determine her ultimate punishment.299 Further, she would have been
permitted to introduce mitigating evidence in an attempt to receive leniency in
her sentencing. 30 0 Possible mitigating factors or defenses that Raheleh would
have been able to introduce range from abuse inflicted by her husband to an
altered mental state due to her battle with post-partum depression and her use of
medication provided by her husband. 30 1 Conversely, the jury would also hear
evidence presented by the prosecution on aggravating circumstances connected
to the commission of the crime, such as the timing of the murder and a
subsequent cover-up indicating Raheleh's possible premeditation of the crime.
30 2
294. Fathi, supra note 2, at A3.
295. See id.
296. Cf KUSHA, SACRED supra note 19, at 162-65 (noting that Iran has created constitutional
checks and balances that are often not employed by the judiciary. In reality the procedure has been
described as "anomic at best." Evidence of Iran's minimal use of constitutional checks and
balances is analogous to an inability to properly determine whether a person under Iranian
jurisdiction would be considered arbitrarily executed as Iran currently does not follow its own
procedures).
297. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INT'L REP., IRAN 141, 141-43 (2006); HUM. RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REP. 463,463-68 (2007).
298. See generally Schreiber, supra note 126, at 301 n.210, 302 (noting that the prosecutor has
discretion to negotiate plea agreements as well as the ability to not seek the death penalty in a
crime where the death penalty is applicable).
299. See Schreiber, supra note 126, at 301-03; PALMER, supra note 121, at 92-93.
300. See PALMER,supra note 121, at 115-16.
301. See id.; COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 389-90.
302. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 329; PALMER, supra note 121, at 97-98.
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Ultimately, Raheleh would at least be granted an opportunity to present relevant
evidence that would be weighed by an impartial jury in the defense of her life.303
Although the United States death penalty policy has its own dissidents, the
situation could be worse as shown by the fundamental changes evident after the
Supreme Court's ruling in Furman.304 Today, defendants that face the death
penalty have several levels of discretion and constitutional protections that assist
in alleviating concerns of arbitrary and inconsistent applications of death
sentences.
30 5
B. Why Iran should Re-modernize their system
An impetus for Iran to change its current death penalty process to one
similar to the United States, with the use of a bifurcated trial and guided
discretion, is international pressure upon Iran for human rights violations.
30 6
Currently, Iran receives attacks and the ire of human rights groups such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.3 07 Iran has been singled out
by these groups for its treatment of prisoners, repression of rights of expression
and dissent, torture and ill treatment of detained prisoners, and the use of the
death penalty.30 8 However, Iran's human rights violations may lessen as more
defendants are granted fairer trials within a system that recognizes a defendant's
relevant mitigating factors weighed against the state's aggravating factors when
allocating punishment. 309 Within a fairer system, fewer defendants would be
punished arbitrarily by Iran. 3 10 Additionally, the use of the death penalty in Iran
may slow to a rate similar to that of the United States with the implementation of
guided discretion within a bifurcated trial as evidenced by the United States own
historical use of the death penalty.
311
303. See PALMER, supra note 121, at 115.
304. See ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 5-8.
305. See Patterson, supra note 112, at 1228; Schreiber, supra note 126, at 303-04.
306. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 297, at 141-43; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 297, at
463-68.
307. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 297, at 141-43; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 297, at 463-
68.
308. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 297, at 141-43; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 297, at 463-
68.
309. See PALMER, supra note 121, at 97, 115-16 (noting that with the use of aggravating and
mitigating factors, the arbitrariness in which the death penalty was imposed was lessened more
than during the pre-Furman era of the death penalty, as the class of felons eligible for the death
penalty was lessened while the class of crimes eligible for the death penalty became more
particular).
310. See id.
311. See ZIMRING, supra note 111, at 7-8 (noting that less death row inmates were executed from
larger populations of death row inmates when compared to the 1950s. Typically there are long
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1. How Iran Can Change
Reforming Iran's use of the Shari'a into a workable and flexible system of
laws is a monumental task as evidenced by Iran's current inability to create
modem guidelines.3 12  To create a coherent system, the solutions must not
contradict or subvert the divinely revealed laws of Islam.313 However, discourse
has begun among student associations and reformist groups in Iran that seek to
create a workable Shari'a system that limits the harsh and brutal punishments by
adhering to the Koran principles of forgiveness and regulatory penalties.
314
Additionally, Iran has seen more liberal and reformist political leaders emerge to
challenge the very notion of an Islamic government by favoring a separation of
church and state.3 15 Accordingly, Iran has the ability to institute changes to their
legal system that may not ultimately conform to revealed principles of Shari'a
due to Ayatollah Khomeini's 1988 ruling which exempted the Iranian
government from religious provisions.
316
Historically, the Shari'a has been important in Muslim societies and
governments mostly in relation to the private matters of the people. 3 17 Its use as
a basis for a modem legal system in Iran has been a failure due in part to gaps in
its coverage and inflexible application to the complex problems facing modem
societies. 3W8  To remedy the shortcomings of the Shari'a with present day
sensibilities in adjudicative societies, other Islamic nations have supplemented
the Shari'a with criminal, civil, and commercial codes adapted from European319
models. These adaptations were meant to exist side by side with Shari'a law
and not to supplant it. Iranian authorities have the ability to adapt Iranian law,
delays between a defendant receiving a death sentence and the actual implementation of that
sentence.).
312. See KAR, supra note 25, at 59.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 59-60.
315. ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 211-16 (noting that in recent years the Iranian political field has
seen the election of reformist and liberal politicians such as President Khatami and the 1999
election of a new majlis (legislature) that has been pitted against the current clerical establishment
and regime. These liberal establishments led to a rise in newspapers and magazines that formulate
a dissident message against the ruling regime. However, the dissent has also seen a rise in
adjudication of these outspoken reformers in the form of banishment of the publications and
imprisonment of journalists.).
316. Id. at 210-11.
317. Id. at 220.
318. Id. at 221-22.
319. Id. at 156-57 (noting that Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan currently supplement Shari'a




either through Khomeini's 1988 ruling or through adapting European modeled
codes, to support a dynamic and complex society.
32 1
In its death penalty adjudications, Iran should adopt a bifurcated trial
system that would allow evidence to be channeled to the sentencing entity in an
effort to obtain a less arbitrary application of the death penalty. 322 Moreover,
Iran should limit the discretion that victims and their families exercise over the
criminal process by removing their ability to choose life or death for the
defendant. 323 As Iran has carried out the executions for the victims, it should
also place the discretion to seek the death penalty within the power of the
state.
324
2. Why Iran Will Not Change
Although Iran has the capability and religious directive of Khomeini to
make necessary addendums to Iran's current Shari'a law, the country will most
likely not institute change in the near future. 3 25 The 1979 Revolution in Iran,
which established the current religious regime as the political driving force, was
a popular rebellion against a perceived corrupt dynasty. 326 After the popular
revolution, the power vacuum was filled by a fundamental religious sect led by
Ayatollah Khomeini that has empowered the ruling clerics to control all aspects
of Iranian people's lives through the Shari'a. 327 To change the system now
would require more open discourse about the political process and ability to
change the laws of Iran. 328 Currently, this type of discourse is not happening on
a large scale due to the fear of reprisal from the government and assaults on the
Iranian dissidents through imprisonment, fines, torture, and death. 329 However,
321. See ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 156-57, 220-24.
322. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 143.
323. Compare Schreiber, supra note 126, at 301-03 (noting that the discretion to seek the death
penalty is in the hands of state legislatures and governors to choose whether or not to implement
the death penalty and then the prosecutor to seek the death penalty. Even where the prosecutor has
the ability to seek the death penalty, it cannot be sought for arbitrary reasons. Therefore, even the
prosecutors have limited discretion when attempting to seek the death penalty), with Entessar,
supra note 107, at 97 (noting that certain crimes are considered against the victim and his/her
family allowing the family to seek retribution or compensation from the defendant).
324. See Schreiber, supra note 126, at 301-03.
325. See ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 210-11 (noting that Khomeini's 1988 ruling allows the
Iranian ruler to stand above all divine ordinances if in the best interest of the Muslim people, while
also allowing for the suppression of reform).
326. Halper, supra note 42, at 1163-64.
327. Id. at 1164-65; KAR, supra note 25, at 46.
328. KAR, supra note 25, at 59-61.
329. Id. at 60-61.
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political dissent and retaliation against the religious regime is starting to gain a
foothold in Iran, through the resistance of its people.
330
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over the death penalty is a historic battle that has plagued man
since state sponsored executions were first put into practice. 331 This debate is
only intensifying as the international view is moving towards abolishing the
practice altogether. 332 Therefore, if Iran is to continue implementing the death
penalty, it would benefit the country to standardize a death penalty procedure
similar to that of the United States with the use of guided discretion within a
bifurcated trial where the decision to seek the death penalty is in the hands of the
state. This type of change would lessen the arbitrary and inconsistent use of the
death penalty, as the class of criminals deserving of the punishment could be
narrowed and the discretion of the state to seek the death penalty likely to be
more consistent. 333  This type of reform would be similar to other Islamic
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan where the Shari'a has been
supplemented with codes based on European models. 334 Additionally, Iran's
ruling regime has the authority, following Ayatollah Khomeini's 1988 ruling, to
allow such reform as long as it is in the best interest of the Muslim people. 335
However, due to the fundamentalist nature of the current ruling regime following
the popular revolution of 1979 and the regime's lack of toleration of political
dissent, these changes will most likely not come to fruition.
330. Id.
331. William A. Schabas, Islam and the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 223
(2001).
332. Id. at 223-24; Moratorium, supra note 14.
333. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 112, at 329, 389.
334. ZUBAIDA, supra note 55, at 156-57.
335. Id. at 210-11.
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